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O
ne of the most striking labour market devel-
opments over the past decade is the huge
decline in unemployment in the Netherlands.
Whereas in the early 1980s the Dutch unemploy-
ment rate was as high as 12% and in the early
1990s it was still as high as 8%, it fell to 2% in the
early 21st century. There are several explanations
for this development. According to Van Ours
(2003),the decline in unemployment has to do with
wage moderation, restructuring of the social secu-
rity and part-time labour. So changes in labour
market institutions are responsible for the
improvement in the functioning of the Dutch
labour market. In other OECD countries unem-
ployment has gone down substantially as well. As
Table 1 shows, since the early 1980s also in
Denmark, Ireland, the UK and the US unemploy-
ment has fallen considerably. Table 1 also shows
that in Finland, France, Sweden and Switzerland
unemployment has gone up substantially over the
period 1983 to 2000.
One of the issues in the policy debate is whether
and, if so, to what extent changes in labour market
institutions are responsible for these differences in
the fluctuation of the unemployment rate across
OECD countries. As we will discuss in more detail
below, research indicates that changes in labour
market institutions can bring unemployment down.
A further issue in the policy debate is whether
countries can design a reform for these institutions.
Here, the answer is less clear. Even in a successful
country like the Netherlands it is not clear that the
policy instruments that brought the success were
based on a clever design (Visser and Hemerijck
1997). Only with hindsight was there a Dutch
model. So, countries can learn from each other, but
as Freeman (1998) stresses, countries cannot just
borrow some features from successful countries
and expect the unemployment rate to decline since
a particular institutional feature may perform dif-
ferently depending on the overall institutional
framework.In other words,the effect of a system of
institutions is different from the sum of the effects
of the individual institutions. This is indeed what
our contribution is to the literature on unemploy-
ment and labour market institutions (Belot and Van
Ours 1999; 2001). Instead of investigating the
effects of institutions individually we investigated
the effects of interactions between labour market
institutions.
Overview of the literature
Over the past decades there has been a growing
interest in the role of institutional labour market
rigidities, which were more prevalent in Europe
than in the US. The labour market institutions
that are usually considered in the literature are
regulations that influence more or less directly
the functioning of the labour market. Hence,
there has been interest in taxes levied on labour,
in labour standards and employment protection
legislation, in trade unions, in wage bargaining
systems, in minimum wage(s), in benefit systems,
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Table 1
Changes in unemployment rates, 1983–2000
Group Unemployment Countries




2 Rise of 0-4% Austria, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Norway,
New Zealand
3 Fall of 0-4% Australia, Belgium,
Canada
4 Fall of 4% or
more
Denmark, Ireland,
Netherlands, UK, USin active labour market policies,in education poli-
cies and in barriers to geographical mobility. The
choice is of course to some extent arbitrary as
some of these institutions (such as the tax system)
concern also people who are not in the labour
force and the list can be extended to include, for
example, product market regulations.
The literature draws important lessons concerning
the role of institutional rigidities on economic per-
formance but some puzzles persist. There are
many studies concentrating on some particular
institutions but only a few studies look at a more
complete picture of the institutional framework.A
first series of studies analyse the direct effects of
institutions on indicators such as the unemploy-
ment rate, the employment rate and the growth
rate of the national product. (For an overview see
Nickell and Layard 1999.) 
At the start the analyses were based on cross-sec-
tional information showing that tax rates, replace-
ment rates, benefit duration, union density and
union coverage had a positive effect on unemploy-
ment (Layard et al. 1991). After that a number of
studies were published that extended the analysis
in various directions. Scarpetta (1996) uses yearly
data covering the period 1983 to 93. The explana-
tory variable is the structural unemployment rate1
as computed by the OECD. Scarpetta first looks
at structural determinants of the unemployment
rate and then, at the role that labour market po-
licies and institutional factors play in determin-
ing the persistence of unemployment.The conclu-
sion is that institutions matter both for the deter-
mination of the structural unemployment rate and
for the speed of labour market adjustments.
Scarpetta finds different results than previous
ones for labour taxes (no significant effect) and
employment protection legislation (significant
positive effect).
Daveri and Tabellini (1997) look at complementar-
ities between labour taxes and the structure of col-
lective bargaining systems. Their analysis is based
on data for fourteen OECD countries over the
period 1965 to 91.They find that labour taxes have
a larger negative effect on unemployment in coun-
tries with strong unions.They also show that decen-
tralised and centralised countries are performing
better, irrespective of the level of labour taxes.
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) extend the
previous analysis by considering a large number of
countries, taking the recent institutional develop-
ments into account (in particular, the development
of collective bargaining structures and of employ-
ment protection legislation) and testing for the exis-
tence of interactions between policies and/or insti-
tutional factors.They conclude that the tightening of
eligibility conditions and the cut in unemployment
benefits, as well as the relaxation of the regulation
on fixed term contracts may have played a major
role in the success of some OECD countries in
reducing their unemployment rate. Furthermore,
assuming that in countries with a medium degree of
centralisation (negotiations mainly taking place at
the industry level) coordination among actors might
be particularly crucial, they upgrade countries with
a medium level of centralisation but a high degree
of coordination. They show that the tax wedge and
employment protection have a stronger effect in
countries with an intermediary level of centraliza-
tion. Also, unemployment benefits have a larger
effect in countries with relatively high levels of
expenditures on active labour market policies.
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) use data based on
twenty OECD countries and eight five-year peri-
ods, from 1960–64 to 1995.They test for the effects
of institutions, shocks (in total factor productivity,
real interest rate and labour demand shifts) and
interactions between institutions and shocks on the
unemployment rate.They find that indeed the eco-
nomic shocks2 have a larger positive effect on
unemployment when the replacement rate is high,
the benefit duration is long, the employment pro-
tection is strict, the union density is high and the
coordination is low.
Nickell,Nunziata and Ochel (2002) show that most
of the unemployment histories can be explained by
institutional changes.Their study is based on annu-
al data for twenty OECD countries over the peri-
od 1961 to 95. Besides estimating the direct effects
of labour market institutions, they introduce inter-
action terms between institutions and economic
shocks, defined in a similar way as in Blanchard
and Wolfers. They conclude that interactions
between shocks and institutions do not add very
much to the explanation of unemployment rates.
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1 Defined as the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment.
2The economic shocks enter the regression in such a way that their
expected theoretical sign on the unemployment rate is positive.
Hence, they examine a fall in the total factor productivity, a rise in
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Recent literature suggests that institutional rigidi-
ties may even interact with the characteristics of
the population (Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2003).
Some institutions may have a larger negative effect
on some individuals than others.
Our study
Table 2 gives an overview of changes in labour
market institutions averaged over countries that
have shown a similar development of unemploy-
ment. As in Table 1 four groups of countries are
distinguished. From Table 2 it appears that the
group of countries with the largest decline in
unemployment had on average a decline in tax
rates, whereas in the countries of the other groups
tax rates increased.In the two groups with a declin-
ing unemployment rate, benefit replacement rates
did not go up or remained stable whereas in the
other countries replacement rates increased. In the
groups of countries with a major increase in the
unemployment rate, union density hardly declined
while it did decline substantially in the other coun-
tries. There does not seem to be a big difference
between the groups of countries in terms of
changes in employment protection and level of
bargaining (centralisation).
Thus, based on Table 2 it appears as if changes in
taxes, benefits and union bargaining power are the
most relevant institutional changes. However, it
may be that some combinations of institutional
changes are more relevant than others. That is
where our studies (Belot and Van Ours 1999; 2001)
come in. In stead of investigating the effects of
institutions individually we investigated interac-
tions between labour market institutions. In our
analysis we use data on seven five-year periods
(1960 to 95) and eighteen OECD countries. We
find support for the interaction hypothesis.We find
that labour market institutions have a significant
effect on unemployment rates only if interaction
variables are included. Without the presence of
interaction variables, we find that the direct effects
of labour market institutions disappear as soon as
time and country effects are included in the regres-
sion. We investigated three specific interactions:
Tax rates and replacement rates, employment pro-
tection and bargaining level, union density and
bargaining level. We find that in a lot of countries
the interaction between tax rates and replacement
rates drove the development of their unemploy-
ment rates. For other countries changes in the bar-
gaining structure have been more relevant. Hence,
employment protection has a significant negative
effect on the unemployment rate only in countries
where wage bargaining takes place at the level of
the firm. The reverse is true for union density.
Union density has a positive effect on unemploy-
ment rates only when the bargaining system is
decentralised. One explanation could be that these
institutions have a larger impact on wages in coun-
tries where bargaining is decentralised.This means
that employment protection would lead to stronger
wage moderation in decentralised countries and
unions would play a more important role in this
type of countries. Given our conclusion that inter-
actions matter, we investigated whether there was
an optimal combination of institutional reforms.We
calculated for each country what would have hap-
pened if they had implemented the institutional
reforms of other countries.We find that most of the
OECD countries would have had a better labour
market performance if they had implemented the
reforms made in the Netherlands or in the UK.(See
also Nickell and Van Ours 2000.) These successful
countries were therefore not only successful
because of a favourable combination of institutions
and reforms, but also because they implemented
institutional changes that were better, irrespective
of the initial institutional framework.
Conclusions
Cross-country studies that
relate unemployment rates to
labour market institutions have
limitations in the sense that
institutions do not change fre-
quently, and cross-sectional
variation only is insufficient to
catch the true effect of institu-
tions. Also, there are many
Table 2
















1 4.5 5.0 –3.8 –0.3 –0.4
2 2.2 2.5 –6.3 –6.7 0.1
3 3 0           1 –4 –0.3
4 –0.6 0.2 –5.4 –6.6 –0.2
a) Changes from early 1980s to early 1990s; unweighted averages.country specific events that may affect unemploy-
ment but which cannot all be taken into account.
Part of this criticism also applies to our study. For
example, our study neglects the effects of German
unification, the large growth of part-time labour in
the Netherlands, the big EU subsidies for Ireland
and the loss of Eastern Europe exports for Finland.
Our main conclusion is that institutions matter and
that interactions between institutions are impor-
tant. In this respect, countries with high unemploy-
ment rates could learn from successful countries by
imitation. However, there is not just one recipe for
a successful performance of the labour markets.
Further research is needed to investigate the com-
plexity of the effects of institutional rigidities on
economic performance in more detail.
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